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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [UN](#) [YI](#)
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' NOVEMBER 27 MEETING WITH UN
SPECIAL ENVOY MARTTI AHTISAARI

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ALEX WOLFF REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Status, Martti Ahtisaari, told U/S Burns he plans to deliver his package of recommendations on the future status of Kosovo to the UN Security Council in March 2006, after presenting it to Serbian and Kosovar leadership in late January. Ahtisaari's cover report to the UNSC will include a call for Kosovo independence with international supervision. Ahtisaari plans to allow a 10-14 day period for Belgrade and Pristina to consider his recommendations and offer their comments, before he takes them to the Council. However, he remains concerned about calls from Russia and EU members to prolong the negotiations. U/S Burns offered full U.S. support for Ahtisaari's timeline and plans, but acknowledged the difficulties ahead in keeping the Europeans and Security Council united to complete final status. END SUMMARY

¶2. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Under Secretary Burns
Ambassador Alejandro Wolff
Ambassador Frank Wisner
P Staff - Anja Manuel
USUN - Kirk McBride
USUN - Drew Schufletowski
EUR Note taker - Stephen Gee

UNOSEK

UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Status Talks Martti Ahtisaari
Kai Sauer - Senior Advisor to the Status Envoy
Bradford Bell - U.S. Liaison
Dmitri Schlapachenko - Political Officer

¶3. (C) Ahtisaari told Burns he is prepared to deliver his settlement proposals to the parties as early as January 29 or 30, 2007, following on Serbian Parliamentary elections which will take place on January 21. Ahtisaari would travel to Belgrade and Pristina on the same day to present his proposals to both parties, which will include a section with general principles and annexes with specific recommendations. Ahtisaari has decided against holding another summit meeting with Belgrade and Pristina, after consulting with the Contact Group. He does plan to return to Belgrade and Pristina in mid February to hear reactions and comments of the political leaders to his proposals. He will submit the plan to the UNSC immediately thereafter, accompanied by a report spelling out the justifications for his proposals. It will be very

clear in the report that his recommended final status should be "independence for Kosovo, with supervision over its sovereignty."

¶4. (C) Ahtisaari expressed concern, however, about likely attempts to prolong the negotiations. Both the French and Slovaks have told Ahtisaari and his deputy, Albert Rohan, they are in favor of using his proposals as a basis for reopening negotiations. Spain and Romania have called to extend the negotiations in hopes of finding an agreement acceptable to both sides. The Russians also have continued to push a hard line against concluding the process. At the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki on November 24, the Russians had argued that U.S. and E.U. interest in Kosovo would wane after final status, and the Europeans would be left with an unstable Islamic state in the Balkans. The Russians argued, instead, for a 5-10 year process to arrive at a final status agreement. Ahtisaari fears the arguments for more negotiations are gaining traction.

¶5. (C) Burns acknowledged the difficulties that lie ahead with the Russians and expressed full U.S. support for Ahtisaari's timeline and plan for concluding the negotiations. Burns said he believed the Russians cannot sustain a fight on Kosovo forever in the UNSC, since they will be isolated in their position. The Russians will work on individual countries to weaken their resolve, Burns said, and therefore the U.S. and Europeans must hold firm. Otherwise, the Russians will gain one compromise, and then proceed to slice that compromise further. Burns also said he feared the Germans were not as resolute as we would like.

¶6. (C) Burns asked Ahtisaari if he had thought through the possible reactions of Kosovo Serbs in the north to his status proposals, to which Ahtisaari responded that he has organized

a meeting in December with UNMIK and KFOR to go over possible scenarios. Ahtisaari said it would be difficult to maintain territorial unity, because of the past failure of UNMIK to prosecute perpetrators of inter-ethnic crimes and challenge parallel structures. Ahtisaari and Burns agreed that KFOR and UNMIK would need to have firm resolve to maintain a safe and secure environment in the days immediately after final status.

¶7. (C) Ambassador Wisner raised the need for Ahtisaari to have his staff complete work on talking points and a press strategy that can be used to explain details of the package to the Kosovar people. He predicted that the Serbs will continue to provoke the Kosovars by demanding high-level visits by Serbian leaders during the January holidays and in the lead up to the elections. Wisner suggested we counsel UNMIK to be accommodating if possible, as well as remind the Kosovars not to react to provocations. Wisner invited Ahtisaari to think through with in the coming weeks, how he might respond to a scenario where the Russians succeed in blocking a Security Council resolution.

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